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Abstract
Background: There has been a marked increase in the number of Caesarean sections in many countries during
the last decades. In several countries, Caesarean sections are carried out in more than 20 per cent of births. These
high Caesarean section rates give cause for concern, both from an economic and a medical perspective. A general
opinion among epidemiologists is that the increase in the number of Caesarean sections during the last decade
has been greater than could be expected in relation to medical risk factors. Therefore, other explanations must be
sought. We studied one potential explanation; the effect that the increase in hospital revenue per bed during the
period 1976-2005 has had on the Caesarean section rate in Norway. During this period, hospital revenue increased
by about 260% (adjusted for inflation).
Methods: The analyses were carried out using data from the Medical Birth Registry 1976-2005 from Norway. The
data were merged with data about hospital revenue, which were obtained from Statistics Norway. The analyses
were carried out using annual data from 46 hospitals. A fixed effect regression model was estimated. Relevant
medical control variables were included.
Results: The elasticity of the Caesarean section rate with respect to hospital revenue per bed was 0.13 (p < 0.05).
This represents an increase in the Caesarean section rate from the basis year 1976 to the final year 2005 of about
35 per cent. Most of the variables measuring characteristics of the health status of the mother and child had the
expected effects.
Conclusion: The increase in hospital revenue explains only a small part of the increase in the Caesarean section
rate in Norway during the last three decades. The increase in the Caesarean section rate is considerably greater
than could be expected, based on the increase in hospital revenue alone. The strength of our study is that we
have estimated a cause and effect relationship. This was done by using fixed effects for hospitals, a lagged revenue
variable and by including an extensive set of control variables for the risk factors of the mother and the baby.
Background
There has been a marked increase in the number of
Caesarean sections in many countries during the last
few decades [1-5]. For example, Caesarean sections are
now performed in over 22 per cent of all births in Great
Britain [2] and in 30 per cent of all births in the USA
[3,6]. The proportion in the Nordic countries is slightly
lower - just under 20 per cent [7]. In all the Nordic
countries, the Caesarean section rate was about 5 per
cent or lower at the beginning of the 1970s. Caesarean
section is now the most common major surgical proce-
dure for women in the USA [3,6]. With this great
increase in the number of Caesarean sections, the cost
of maternity care has also markedly increased. Hender-
son et al. have done a systematic review of all published
studies on the costs of alternative modes of delivery up
to 1999 [8]. Altogether they identified 975 studies. Only
49 of these studies fulfilled the inclusion criteria for
their review. For these studies the cost of a Caesarean
section was in the range £1238 - £8273. The cost for a
normal delivery was £629 - £5012. These findings imply* Correspondence: josteing@odont.uio.no1Department of Community Dentistry, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
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that the cost of a Caesarean delivery is about twice the
cost of a normal delivery.
It has been claimed that the Caesarean section rate is
too high, and that future increase in the rate should be
limited, for both economic and medical reasons. For
example, in the WHO guidelines, it is recommended
that the Caesarean section rate should not be more than
10-15 per cent in any country [9,10]. This is supported
by studies that show an increased risk of adverse side
effects with Caesarean section, particularly if the medical
indications are weak [11-13]. For example, there is an
increased risk of stillbirth in the next pregnancy,
reduced fertility, and allergy or asthma in the child
[12,14-18].
At present, there are no adequate explanations for
why the Caesarean section rate has increased so mark-
edly. Epidemiologists have studied whether the increase
can be explained in relation to risk factors, but have
found little support for this theory [19-22]. The preva-
lence of several of the medical conditions that are indi-
cations for Caesarean section (for example failure of
development of the foetus, abnormal presentation and
twins) have been quite stable over time. Even though
the prevalence of some of these indications may have
increased, the increases are too small to explain the
large increase in the Caesarean section rate. Thus, it is
generally believed that some of the increase can be
accounted for by non-medical factors. One potential fac-
tor to consider is the role of the funding system, and
whether the funding system provides incentives in
favour of Caesarean sections.
Most of the research in this area is from the USA.
There physicians or hospitals are reimbursed from pri-
vate and public insurance on a fee-for-service basis for
each delivery. Studies have also been carried out in
other countries. Many of these countries also have pri-
vate funding. Within this field of research the focus has
been on how relative differences in fees for Caesarean
delivery and normal delivery can influence the choice of
type of delivery (for example see: [23-29]). If the level of
reimbursement for Caesarean delivery is high, this can
influence physicians to choose Caesarean delivery rather
than normal delivery. The empirical literature gives no
clear answer to this research question. Some studies
have found that higher fees for Caesarean delivery sti-
mulate a higher rate of this type of delivery [25,28].
Other studies have found little or no effect [24,26,27].
Another type of study has focussed on the effect of
remuneration systems and competition on the type of
delivery [27-34]. One of the most cited studies is the
study of Gruber & Owings (1996) [30]. During the per-
iod 1970 to 1982, the birth rate in the USA fell by 13.5
per cent. In order to prevent a fall in revenue, obstetri-
cians compensated by carrying out more Caesarean
sections, which generate more revenue than ordinary
deliveries. Several other studies from the 1980s and the
1990s also found that the rate of Caesarean section was
influenced by how physicians were remunerated
[28,30,32].
To our knowledge, there are few studies that have
investigated why the Caesarean section rate is also
increasing in countries with publically-financed mater-
nity care. This is a relevant research question, since the
Caesarean section rates in these countries has also
increased during the last decades. In this study, we
investigated the increase in the Caesarean section rate
in Norway. The organization of maternity care in Nor-
way is quite different from countries with private fund-
ing. In Norway, women give birth in publically-owned
and publically-financed hospitals [35]. Doctors receive a
fixed salary and have no personal economic advantage
by carrying out a Caesarean delivery rather than a nor-
mal delivery. There is little competition between hospi-
tals for women giving birth. The country is divided into
hospital areas in which the capacity of maternity units is
planned according to the expected number of births
within the catchment area. Mothers pay no fee, irrespec-
tive of the type of delivery. The hospitals receive rev-
enue according to the number of deliveries. The
revenue scheme is designed so that there is no eco-
nomic advantage for the hospital to perform a Caesar-
ean section rather than a normal delivery (for a detailed
review of the organization of Norwegian hospitals, see
[36]).
Over the last few decades, hospital budgets have
increased markedly. For example, in Norway, the rev-
enue per bed increased by almost 200 per cent from
1980 to 1990 (values adjusted for inflation) [35]. Similar
increases have been reported from other OECD coun-
tries [37]. The aim of this study was to investigate
whether the increase in hospital revenue has influenced
the increase in the Caesarean section rate in Norway,
and if it has, how large the effect is.
With increased budgets, the hospitals have greater
opportunities to offer Caesarean deliveries, which are
expensive, rather than normal deliveries, which are
cheaper. There can be several non-medical explanations
for doctors offering Caesarean deliveries rather than
normal deliveries. The most common reason that is pro-
posed is that the position of women in relation to obste-
tricians has been strengthened over time, and that it is
therefore easier for women to have their wishes to have
a Caesarean delivery met [38-40]. One consequence of
this is that more Caesarean sections can be carried out
as a result of pressure from mothers, even if a Caesarean
delivery is not medically indicated. With increased hos-
pital funding, it is easier for obstetricians to meet the
wishes of these mothers. Another possible explanation is
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that the practice of obstetricians is influenced by fear of
litigation if something goes wrong with a normal deliv-
ery [41-43]. In borderline cases, it is better to carry out
a Caesarean section to be on the safe side. This issue
has been studied particularly in the USA, where evi-
dence to support this supposition has been found (for a
review of the literature see: [41,43,44]). There are no
Norwegian studies of defensive medicine in maternity
care. However, it may be that some of the increase in
the Caesarean section rate in Norway can be explained
by the increase in hospital revenue giving more scope
for obstetricians to practice defensive medicine. There
have also been dramatic developments in medical tech-
nology, with a concurrent marked increase in survival
for new-born babies, who would not have survived ear-
lier [45,46]. The benefit of much of this new medical
technology is greater with a less stressful delivery, which
a Caesarean delivery can be.
We investigated the research question using a large set
of data containing detailed medical information about
all births in all hospitals in Norway during the period
1976-2005. We have information about annual revenue
for each hospital. As far as we know, no-one has pre-
viously studied the effect of hospital revenue on choice
of type of delivery over such a long period of time. The
data and the analyses are described in detail in the
Methods section. We then present the results. Finally
we discuss our findings.
Methods
The source of the data
The analyses were carried out on data from the Medi-
cal Birth Registry (MBRN) of Norway for the period
1976-2005 http://www.fhi.no and data from Statistics
Norway. In Norway, all maternity units have a duty to
report all births to MBRN, i.e. the register encom-
passes the whole population of mothers who give birth
[47]. The MBRN contains detailed information about
the health status of the mother and the baby. The
quality of these data are monitored regularly, and they
are reliable [47,48]. The data from MBRN were aggre-
gated to the level of the hospital, and merged with
data about hospital revenue, which was obtained from
Statistics Norway. There are 19 counties in Norway,
which had responsibility for hospital funding during
the period 1976-2001. From 2002 hospital ownership
was transferred to five state-owned Regional Health
Authorities [49]. Although hospital ownership changed,
the system for allocating funding to hospitals did not
change. This means that the revenue data are compar-
able for the whole period. The study has been
approved by the Regional Committee for Medical and
Health Research Ethics.
The model specification
We estimated the following fixed effect regression
model:
Caesarit = αi + γYeart + β1Rev hospit−1
+ β2Control variablesit + εit
(1)
where the subscript i denotes the hospital and t
denotes year. Caesar is the Caesarean section rate for
each hospital. Our key variable is Rev_hosp, which mea-
sures hospital revenue per bed in NOK 1000, deflated to
1970 prices by using the price index for local govern-
ment consumption [50]. The variable is lagged one year;
i.e. we assume that the present year’s Caesarean section
rate is determined by the previous year’s hospital rev-
enue per bed (for variable definitions and descriptive
statistics see Table 1). Both Caesar and Rev_hosp were
transformed into natural logarithms. In this log-log spe-
cification the estimated coefficient of the variable
Rev_hosp gives the elasticity of the Caesarean section
rate with respect to hospital revenue per bed.
In Eq. (1), ai is the hospital-specific effect that varies
between hospitals, but which does not vary for the same
hospital over time. Therefore, ai measures all observable
characteristics that are time-invariant for each hospital
over time. In that way unobserved hospital-specific char-
acteristics, which vary cross-sectionally between hospi-
tals, are cancelled out. This is an advantage as this
reduces potential bias in the regression coefficient for
hospital revenue [51]. g is a vector of year dummies,
included to take account of events that can vary from
year to year, but which affect all hospitals equally. εit is
an identically and independently distributed error term.
The distribution of the number of deliveries was very
skewed (Table 2). A small number of hospitals had a
very large number of deliveries. For example, the three
largest hospitals have over 20 per cent of all births. This
represented over 3 000 births on average per year. In
comparison, the 20 smallest hospitals had only 13 per
cent of all births. This represents less than 500 births
on average per year. It is probable that measurement
errors in the data are positively correlated with the
number of births per hospital. Therefore, we have esti-
mated Eq. (1) with the number of births per hospital as
a weight.
Control variables
Important control variables are characteristics of the
health status of the mother and child, which vary
between hospitals and over time [52,53]. Several of the
medical conditions mentioned below are correlated with
slow or no progress in labour or signs of foetal distress.
A Caesarean section can then be indicated to prevent
damage to the child. Large babies are more often
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delivered by Caesarean section than babies of average
weight. The probability for a Caesarean section also
increases if the foetus has an abnormal presentation, if
preeclampsia is a complication, and if the mother has
multiple births. Mothers with a high level of education
have healthier babies than mothers with a low level of
education [46,54]. This is taken account of by including
the mothers’ educational status in the analyses. We also
included two variables that describe characteristics of
the hospital: the number of births in total, and the
Table 1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Mean
Variable Definition 1976 Whole material 2005
caesar = the proportion of Caesarean sections 0.047 0.108 0.146
(0.028) (0.044) (0.049)
rev_hosp = hospital revenue per bed in NOK 1000, deflated to 1970 prices 101.32 205.42 364.43
(20.25) (91.41) (66.99)
age_le201 = the proportion of mothers less than 20 years 0.116 0.057 0.026
(0.033) (0.033) (0.013)
age_hi351 = the proportion of mothers older than 35 years 0.044 0.072 0.117
(0.015) (0.031) (0.030)
edu_univ2 = the proportion of mothers with university/college education 0.126 0.305 0.450
(0.037) (0.101) (0.107)
edu_uss2 = the proportion of mothers with upper secondary school education 0.557 0.453 0.362
(0.056) (0.073) (0.076)
weight_le25003 = the proportion of babies with a birthweight less than 2500 g 0.045 0.034 0.031
(0.016) (0.020) (0.021)
weight_hi45003 = the proportion of babies with a birthweight greater than 4500 g 0.031 0.039 0.042
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
ab_present = the proportion of babies with abnormal presentation (including breech 0.043 0.059 0.088
presentation, transverse presentation, abnormal cephalic presentation and other) (0.016) (0.024) (0.030)
preeclam = the proportion of mothers with preeclampsia (including unspecified, mild and severe) 0.021 0.029 0.031
(0.111) (0.015) (0.016)
mult_birth = the proportion of mothers with multiple births 0.025 0.024 0.025
(0.010) (0.024) (0.019)
no_births = the number of births in total 838 1028 1176
(723) (1034) (1388)
weekend = the proportion of births on a Saturday or a Sunday 0.248 0.248 0.274
(0.025) (0.031) (0.111)
year_2002 = 1 if year equals 2002 to 2005, 0 otherwise
Mean values and standard deviation in brackets.
1 Reference category: the proportion of mothers aged 20-35 years
2 Reference category: the proportion of mothers with compulsory school education
3 Reference category: the proportion of babies with a birthweight 2500-4500 g
Table 2 The number of hospitals according to the number of births per year. 1976-2005
Number of births
per year
Number of
hospitals
Percentage of
hospitals
Average number of
births per year for all
the hospitals within the
category
Percentage of
births
< 300 7 15.2 1 248 2.6
300-399 7 15.2 2 345 5.0
400-499 6 13.0 2 763 5.9
500-999 9 19.6 6 165 13.1
1000-1999 10 21.7 14 052 29.8
2000-2999 4 8.7 9 372 19.8
> = 3000 3 6.5 11 273 23.9
Total 46 99.9 47 218 100.1
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proportion of births on a Saturday or a Sunday. A large
maternity unit will have more experience and compe-
tence and better technology to deal with complicated
deliveries than a small unit. Therefore, units with a high
level of competence can carry out more complicated
deliveries as normal deliveries instead of by Caesarean
section. The result can be that there are relatively fewer
Caesarean sections in large units than in small units
[55,56]. It can also be expected that maternity units will
try to carry out planned Caesarean deliveries on week
days rather than weekends, as this is a way for them to
save money. All control variables were log transformed.
This was done in order to improve the interpretability
of the regression coefficients. The regression coefficient
then measure the percentage change in the Caesarean
section rate by a one per cent change in an independent
variable.
We did two additional analyses where we tested for
trends and variations across variables. In the first ana-
lyses we included an interaction term between hospital
revenue per bed (lagged) and number of births. There
we tested whether the effect of hospital revenue varied
according to the size of the hospital. In the second ana-
lysis we included interaction terms between hospital rev-
enue per bed (lagged) and years - altogether 28
interaction terms. There we tested whether the effect of
hospital revenue varied over time.
From 2002, hospital ownership changed. An assump-
tion underlying our analysis is that the revenue data are
comparable over time, i.e. that these data are not influ-
enced by the change in ownership. This is tested by
comparing the regression coefficient for the dummy
variable for 2002 with the coefficient for 2001 (a pre-
and post-2002 test). The effect of hospital ownership on
hospital revenue data may appear with a lag. Therefore,
we did further analyses by including separate dummy
variables for the years successive to 2002.
Number of observations
The analyses were carried out using data from 46 hospi-
tals. We had data for hospital revenue for all the 46 hos-
pitals for each year. Since hospital revenue was lagged
for one year, the analyses were performed over a period
of 29 years (1977-2005). This provided 1 334 observa-
tions over the 29-year period. We lacked information
for some of the control variables for some of the hospi-
tals for some years. A hospital is excluded from the ana-
lyses for the particular year where we lacked
information for the control variables, i.e. the analyses
were performed on an unbalanced set of data with 1
260 observations. In order to test the robustness of our
results we did an additional analysis where we imputed
values for missing data. For each control variable we cal-
culated the mean values for each year. A missing value
for a control variable for a hospital was replaced by the
mean value for that variable for that particular year.
Results
Descriptive results
Rates for all variables are reported in Table 1 and com-
mented on below. The denominator in the rates is the
number of deliveries per hospital. Both the Caesarean
section rate for each hospital and hospital revenue per
bed increased markedly during the 30-year period
(Table 1 and Figure 1). The Caesarean section rate
increased from 0.047 in 1976 to 0.146 in 2005. Corre-
spondingly, hospital revenue per bed increased from just
over NOK 100 000 to NOK 364 000 (adjusted for infla-
tion). There was a slight increase in the mean number
of births per hospital, from 838 in 1976 to 1176 in 2005.
However, this increase is small in relation to the
increase in the number of Caesarean sections.
There has also been an increase in some of the risk
factors for Caesarean section. In particular, the propor-
tion of babies with an abnormal presentation increased
from 0.043 in 1976 to 0.088 in 2005. Also, the propor-
tion of mothers with preeclampsia increased during the
30-year study period, from 0.021 in 1976 to 0.031 in
2005. The proportion of babies with a birth weight
greater than 4500 g also increased slightly.
Regression analysis - main results
The elasticity for the Caesarean section rate with respect
to hospital revenue per bed was 0.137 (p < 0.05) (Table
3 column I). This implies that when hospital revenue
per bed increases by 1 per cent then the Caesarean sec-
tion rate increases by 0.137 per cent. From 1976 to
2005, hospital revenue increased by 260 per cent (Table
1). This represents an increase of about 35 per cent in
the Caesarean section rate, if the elasticity from the esti-
mations is used (the figure appears by multiplying 0.137
by 260). If we use the Caesarean section rate in 1976,
which was 4.7 per cent, an increase of 35 per cent
would predict that the Caesarean section rate in 2005
would be 6.4 per cent.
Most of the variables measuring characteristics of the
health status of the mother and child have the expected
effect on the Caesarean section rate. The Caesarean sec-
tion rate increases by 0.052 per cent when the propor-
tion of babies with a birthweight greater than 4500 g
increases by 1 per cent (Table 3 column I). When the
proportion of mothers 35 years and older increases by 1
per cent, the Caesarean section rate increases by 0.111
per cent. Further, when the proportion of babies with
abnormal presentation increases by one per cent, then
the Caesarean section rate increases by 0.316 per cent.
From 1976 until 2005, the proportion of babies with
abnormal presentation increased from 4.3 per cent to
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8.8 per cent, that is an increase of 105 per cent (Table
1). This corresponds to an increase of 32 per cent in the
Caesarean section rate. If we base our calculations on
the Caesarean section rate in 1976, which was 4.7 per
cent, an increase of 32 per cent would predict that the
Caesarean section rate in 2005 would be 6.3 per cent. A
similar calculation for the proportion of mothers who
have preeclampsia predicts the Caesarean section rate to
be 5.0 per cent by the end of our study period. The
Caesarean section rate decreases by 0.122 per cent when
the size of maternity units increases by 1 per cent
(Table 3 column I). Also, the Caesarean section rate
decreases by 0.345 per cent when the proportion of
deliveries that are carried out at weekends increases by
1 per cent.
Additional analyses
The results from the analysis where we imputed values
for missing data for the control variables are presented
in Table 3, column II. For nearly all variables the regres-
sion coefficients are almost identical to the coefficients
for the main analysis (column I). The interaction term
between hospital revenue per bed (lagged) and number
of births is negative, and statistically significant at the
conventional level (p < 0.05) (Table 3, column III). The
sign of the coefficient implies that the effect of hospital
revenue on the Caesarean section rate decreases as the
hospital size increases. The interaction terms between
hospital revenue per bed and years are not statistically
significant at conventional levels (F-value = 1.47; p >
0.05). The difference between the regression coefficients
for 2002 and 2001 is 0.0052, with a t-value of 0.12 (p =
0.90). The fact that the difference between these coeffi-
cients is not statistically different from zero lends sup-
port to the assumption that the revenue data are
comparable over time. None of the differences between
the coefficient for 2001 and the coefficients for the years
successive to 2002 were statistically significantly differ-
ent from zero at conventional levels (p < 0.05). This
indicates that the effect of changes in hospital ownership
on hospital revenue data does not appear with a lag.
Discussion
This is the first study in which the effect of hospital
funding on the number of Caesarean sections has been
analysed over such a long period of time. In Norway, as
in most western countries, funding of hospitals has
increased markedly from the 1970s up to the present
day. This increase has led to only a minor increase in
Caesarean sections. Therefore, an increase in hospitals’
Figure 1 Trends in hospital revenue per bed and Caesarean sections.
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revenue per bed does not seem to have led to mothers
more often having their desire to have a Caesarean sec-
tion as the preferred mode of delivery met, and/or that
obstetricians practice more defensive medicine. This
indicates that choice of mode of delivery is mainly
determined by medical criteria.
Our finding is in accordance with another recently
published study from Norway which shows that the
position of mothers in maternity care has been wea-
kened over time [57]. In fact, the positions of the obste-
tricians have been strengthened due to the introduction
of advanced diagnostic technology, such as ultrasound,
cardiotocography, ST wave-form analysis and foetal
blood analyses. These new technologies have reduced
clinical uncertainty, so that obstetricians are less depen-
dent on judgement and interpretation of information
from mothers for assessing whether the delivery is pro-
gressing without complications. This has reduced the
possibility for mothers to influence their choice of
delivery.
It is likely that the increased funding to hospitals has
improved the quality of maternity care, for example by
employing more qualified personnel, and by investing in
medical equipment that reduces the risk of complica-
tions during delivery. In particular, the advances in diag-
nostic technology have improved foetal monitoring, both
before and during delivery (for an overview of different
technologies see: [58]). With better diagnosis and moni-
toring, it is also easier to detect foetal asphyxia and slow
progress in labour, which are often indications for a
Caesarean section. Concurrent with the increase in hos-
pital funding, with the subsequent increase in the Cae-
sarean section rate, a marked decrease in infant
mortality has been observed in Norway [59,60]. Annual
mean infant mortality, measured as deaths under 1 year
of age per 1000 live births, was 9.0 for the period 1976-
1980 and 3.5 for the period 2001-2005 [60]. A corre-
sponding decrease has been observed in most of the
other OECD countries [61]. A contributory factor to
this decrease can be the raised standard of both person-
nel and equipment that has resulted from increased hos-
pital funding [45].
There was a slight increase in several of the risk fac-
tors during the study period (Table 1). For example, the
babies became heavier and the mothers became older.
There was also an increase in the proportion of babies
with abnormal presentation and mothers with pree-
clampsia. All these risk factors had a positive effect on
the Caesarean section rate. Our calculations above
showed that the predicted Caesarean section rate on the
basis of the risk factors is far less than the observed rate
of 0.146 in 2005. This supports the view of epidemiolo-
gists that the increase in the Caesarean section rate dur-
ing the last three decades is considerably greater than
Table 3 Regressions with the proportion of Caesarean
sections per hospital as the dependent variable
Variable Main
analysis
Imputation
for
missing
values
Test for
whether
the effect
of
hospital
revenue
per bed
varies
according
to
number of
births
I II III
Intercept -1.262 ** -1.207 ** -3.210 **
(2.38) (2.45) (3.12)
rev_hosp (lagged) 0.137 ** 0.153 ** 0.462 **
(2.38) (2.63) (2.88)
age_le201 -0.012 0.014 -0.016
(0.36) (0.42) (0.48)
age_hi351 0.111 ** 0.123 ** 0.110 **
(2.78) (3.12) (2.77)
edu_univ2 -0.064 0.015 -0.094
(0.78) (0.20) (1.13)
edu_uss2 -0.372 ** -0.361 ** -0.424 ***
(2.97) (2.88) (3.34)
weight_le25003 -0.013 -0.009 -0.002
(0.53) (0.39) (0.11)
weight_hi45003 0.052 0.036 0.053
(1.59) (1.12) (1.61)
ab_present 0.316 **** 0.316 **** 0.300 ****
(10.80) (10.81) (9.95)
preeclam 0.126 **** 0.122 **** 0.130 ****
(6.57) (6.34) (6.77)
mult_birth 1.709 * 1.715 * 1.283
(1.89) (1.90) (1.39)
no_births -0.122 ** -0.106 ** 0.153
(3.06) (2.65) (1.15)
weekend -0.345 *** -0.261 ** -0.333 **
(3.34) (2.92) (3.23)
rev_hosp (lagged) × no_births -0.046 **
(2.17)
Number of observations 1260 1334 1260
Number of hospitals 46 46 46
R2 0.74 0.74 0.74
All variables ln transformed. Regression coefficients with t-values in brackets.
1 Reference category: the proportion of mothers aged 20-35 years
2 Reference category: the proportion of mothers with compulsory school
education
3 Reference category: the proportion of babies with a birthweight 2500-4500 g
**** p < 0.0001
*** p < 0.001
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.10
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could be expected, based on risk factors alone [19-22].
Our results also support findings from other studies,
which show that units with a high level of competence
can carry out more complicated deliveries as normal
deliveries instead of Caesarean section [55,56]. This is
particularly the case for hospitals that have high revenue
per bed (Table 3, column III). These hospitals have a
sufficient number of personnel and advanced technology
to deal with normal deliveries that are complicated, and
which otherwise would have been delivered by Caesar-
ean section. That fewer Caesarean sections are carried
out at weekends than on weekdays is as expected. Hos-
pitals save money in this way.
From a policy point of view the findings of our study
are encouraging. Caesarean sections are mainly deter-
mined by the medical risk factors of the mother and the
baby. An increase in hospital revenue can be used by
policy makers as an instrument to increase the quality
of maternity services both in terms of more qualified
personnel and equipment. Increased hospital budgets do
not lead to any major side-effects such as unnecessary
Caesarean sections, either because the obstetricians
meet the wishes of the mothers for type of delivery, or
because the obstetricians practice defensive medicine.
Caution must be used in generalizing the findings of
this study to other countries where maternity care is
organized differently. This applies particularly to coun-
tries where many births take place in private clinics,
where obstetricians are remunerated on a fee-for-service
basis and where mothers have private insurance for
deliveries. For example, if obstetricians are remunerated
on a fee-for-service basis, there can be an incentive to
carry out a Caesarean section rather than a normal
delivery (for a review see: [62]). In that case the obstetri-
cians might go along with the mother’s wish for a Cae-
sarean section because this is consistent with the
obstetrician’s own private economic interests. Similarly,
in health care systems with private health insurance the
obstetricians can perform Caesarean sections that are
not medically necessary in order to avoid litigation if
something goes wrong with a normal delivery.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our findings show that the effect of an
increase in hospital revenue per bed on the Caesarean
section rate in Norway during the last three decades is
small as indicated by an elasticity of 0.13. The strength
of our study is that we have estimated a cause and effect
relationship. This has been done in three different ways.
First, we used a fixed effect model in which unobserved
hospital-specific characteristics, which vary cross-sec-
tionally between hospitals, have been cancelled out. Sec-
ond, we used lagged revenue; i.e. the revenue variable is
measured one year ahead of the Caesarean section rate.
Third, in the analyses we have included an extensive set
of control variables for the risk factors of the mother
and the baby. These risk factors are correlated with rev-
enue, and they vary between hospitals over time. These
variables have significant effects on the Caesarean sec-
tion rate. The inclusion of variables for the risk factors
of the mother and the baby increases the likelihood that
we have obtained an unbiased and causal estimate of
the effect that hospital revenue per bed (lagged) has on
the Caesarean section rate.
From a policy perspective hospital budgets can be
increased without that leading to any side-effects such
as unnecessary Caesarean sections either because the
obstetricians meet the wishes of the mothers about type
of delivery, or because the obstetricians practice defen-
sive medicine. Rather, increased hospital revenue is
likely to improve the quality of maternity care.
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